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The Origins of the Bank of A. Levy
Many banks in the American West were founded by merchants who drifted into banking (Schweikart (1982) , Doti and Schweikart (1991) ). Typically, these merchants had no special expertise in banking but discovered that banking complemented and then surpassed their commercial interests. The origins and early development of the Bank of A. Levy follows this pattern. The bank began as a private bank or unincorporated bank. The high barriers to entry, notably the minimum capital requirements, set by the National Banking Act of 1864 and the state banking laws spurred the growth of these institutions between the Civil War and the turn of the century (James (1978) , White (1983) ).
On the frontier, especially in smaller communities, the general store was often the center of business life and might evolve into a private bank. Most private bankers combined some other form of business with banking. The majority of these institutions were very modest, reflecting the need to fill small niches in the financial system. After 1890, states eased entry requirements and many banned unincorporated banking, inducing or forcing many private bankers to take out a state or national charter (James, 1978 It was growing rapidly, serving as the point of export for the rich agricultural county (Kramer and Stern, 1975) .
By 1890, the county had a population of 10,071, according to the U.S. Census. The predominance of men--5,881--reflects the fact that it was on the agricultural frontier. There were also a large number of immigrants, 1,861, most of whom were European.
The census recorded 2185 dwellings. banking, but none were as successful as Achille Levy (Kramer and Stern, 1975) . The growth of all his businesses led Achille to hire his recently arrived brother-in-law, Henri Levy, as general bookkeeper in 1884 (A. Levy, 1991) . The next year, Levy increased his independence by dissolving a partnership with Wolff who paid him $57,500 for his share.
Although his business was operating in 1885 under a sign of $A. Levy: Grain, Wool and Produce. Commission & Forwarding,# Levy was now a serious banker. In the first records of Levy s banking operations, April 1885-May 1886, he made loans to 90 customers.
These loans were concentrated among a few prominent farmers, with four-sevenths of the loans going to 13 individuals. The $54,000 of loans generated $1,400 in interest earnings (A. Levy, 191 Hueneme jumped (A. Levy, 1991) . The following year, the Oxnard Brothers built the American Beet Sugar Plant in Oxnard, which was the largest structure in the county (Kramer and Stern, 1975 The first time, the commissioners finally managed to inspect all 127 incorporated commercial and savings banks in 1888, they warned about the dangerous practices they had discovered. The Board wanted to examine the unincorporated banks, yet it had no power to do so (Doti and Schweikart, 1994 and held by Levy; only 22 loans were purchased from other lenders. The loan book records the name of the borrower, the sum borrowed, the interest rate, the duration of the loan, the date repaid, plus notes.
In the loan book, the borrower or $drawer# signed a bill or note $in favor of# the $payee# who was Achille Levy, the banker.
These $bills# were not resold but were held until payment by
Levy. The loans were, in effect, unsecured promissory notes.
T. Russell Carroll, first bookkeeper and finally vice president of the bank, described Levy as a disciple of the $character loan# method.
If he determined that an applicant was of good character, Levy was willing to lend large sums with no collateral. But, if he decided that a potential borrower s character was flawed, no loan would be offered no matter what the collateral. According to Carroll, this character method helped to ensure that Levy experienced few losses (Carroll (1958) , A. Levy (1991) (Moulton (1918) , Brief (1966) , White (1998) ).
Much of modern banking theory (Battacharya and Thakor Almost all nineteenth century banking theorists concurred that bank loans should be structured to meet the dictates of the real bills doctrine. This theory held that banks should take only short-term loans to finance the production or shipment of goods, whose final sale would be used to pay off the loan. The bill of exchange was usually regarded as the appropriate and safe instrument for this form of intermediation. Proponents of the real bills doctrine claimed that if banks followed its prescription, loans would be restricted to the legitimate needs of business, and banks would remain liquid. However, this near match of maturity was an illusion.
Levy s loans seem to have been automatically rolled over and there is no evidence in the loan book that any were called before the borrower was ready to repay the debt. It appears that the automatic rolling over of a loan was understood as the payment period for most one day loans was set at one percent per quarter. Figure 3 shows the actual duration for 317 loans. There were 13 loans for which it was not possible to determine when the loan was repaid. The average duration of a loan was 279 days or about nine months.
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The modal range in Figure 3 is between four months and one year. There was very little amortization of the loans made by the Bank of A. Levy. On all but 31 of the loans, the principal was paid off in its entirety at the end of the loan.
For a few loans some irregular payment on the principal was made 7 The average actual term of Levy s borrowed funds was 199 days in 1895. 14 before the loan was concluded.
The actual maturities on A. Levy s loans appear to have been quite long by standards of the period.
According to most contemporary banking authorities, most loans at the turn of the nineteenth century ran for 30, 60 or 90 days, although they were certainly considering nominal not actual maturities. In a 1913 study, the Comptroller of the Currency found that 57 percent of all bank loans were made with maturities of less than ninety days. John James (1978) concluded that it was relatively rare to see loans longer than six months and one year seemed to be the upper bound. He believed the average maturity to be 60 days.
Yet, it was widely known that many commercial loans, maybe 40 to 50 percent of unsecured loans in large cities, were renewed at maturity (Moulton, 1918) . Some limited evidence on country bank practices suggests that agricultural loans typically ran for three to nine months (James, 1978) . The interest rates charged on the loans varied enormously.
As seen in Figure 4 , which reports the interest rate frequencies for 305 loans, the annual interest rate for 197 loans was 4 percent.
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Twenty loans bore 5 percent and 33 loans 6 percent.
Under California law, there was no usury rate, and a surprising 39 loans were charged 40 percent (Holmes and Lord, 1895) .
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The average rate for the whole portfolio was 7.32 percent, a consequence of the fact that one tenth of the loans carried the 40 percent rate. Cautious as Achille Levy might be, he still sustained some losses from his loans.
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Seven loans produced losses that had to be absorbed by the bank, being $charged to P&L.# These loans represented a total loss of $2,742. Losses on the loans ranged from a high of $1640 to $74. The rates charged at the outset seemed no guide as five loans were at 4 percent, one was at 6 percent and one was at 40 percent. Another seven loans were charged to the borrowers deposit accounts when they failed to repay their debts. These loans totaled $2655, with the largest loan being $2120. 
The Pricing of Loans
As an alleged disciple of character loans, Levy would have set loan rates with a knowledge of the risks presented by his customers. There is no indication of risk in the loan book and Levy s pocket notebooks do not appear to have survived. To recover some information on how Levy set loan rates, an econometric analysis of the loans using data from the loan book, the census, and other sources was carried out.
The cost of funds might have influenced the loan rates.
Thus, the current and one month lagged New York commercial paper rates were included in the regressions. property, had a mortgage, was native or foreign born, or was married. Table 1 reports the results of the OLS regressions.
Characterizing the dependent variable, the interest rate, as a continuous variable is not quite appropriate, as there were only nine values. It is also not practical to model the determination of the interest rate as an ordered probit, given the number of rates. Instead, interest rates were grouped as low and high risk. Rates were "high" if they exceeded 7 percent and "low" if they fell below 7 percent, yielding a 1 or a 0 for the dependent variable for the probits reported in Table 2 . In both tables, regressions 1 and 2 used the full sample for which loan rates were available, with either the dollar value of the specific loan or the value of all loans outstanding. These were not used in the same regression as they were highly correlated. The third and fourth regressions include the additional variables, for which there were fewer observations. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The number in parentheses are approximate t-statistics.
In all four regressions, the varying costs of the money market, which moved considerably in this period from 4.94 to 10.14 percent, had no influence on the loan rates. This result is perhaps not surprising as Levy seems to have held his base loan rate constant at 4 percent for two years and his cost of funds for 1895 remained constant at 6 percent. The initial maturity of the loan had little apparent effect on the rate charged in the OLS regression, but the probit estimates are a bit sharper.
In Table 2 's regressions 1 and 2, the coefficients suggest that a higher initial maturity raised rates, implying a positive yield curve.
One indication of reputation, the number of times an individual had previously borrowed was an important variable, reducing the loan rate significantly. Another important variable was the size of the loan, measured either by the individual loan or all outstanding loans to one borrower. The larger the value of the loan(s) outstanding, the higher the rate charged.
Contrary to the claim that a borrower with good character could costlessly increase his or her credit, the OLS regression suggests that every additional $1000 raised the rate by one tenth of a percent. Multiple signatories to the loan, whether it was purchased or whether it was repaid had no apparent effect on the loan rate. Figure 5 shows the number of borrowers who had anywhere from two to eight loans, while Figure 6 shows the dollar value of the multiple loans. century. An Anti-Chinese League was formed in Ventura in 1885 and a mass meeting was held at a union hall the following year.
The league complained (Jennings, 1984 ) that "it is not fair that white laboring men and women cannot gain employment instead of the Chinese." The Chinese community was subsequently intimidated by the police, and punitive taxes were levied on laundries.
Dislike of the Chinese spilled over into the census. The census taker for Ventura Country was careless and hurried in recording the information on the Chinese population, making it impossible to distinguish names.
Local hostility to the Chinese did not prevent Levy from offering them some modest loans. Ha Kay Chang received a one-day $50 loan at 2 percent quarterly, which he repaid in 70 days.
Although this rate was fairly high, it appears that repayment may have eased subsequent terms. After Ah Gow Wong obtained his first loan, a one-day $50 loan at 2 percent quarterly, and repaid it in 108 days, he got a one-day $100 loan at 1.5 percent quarterly, which was repaid in 59 days. While he still had this loan out, Wong borrowed another $100 at the same rate for 88
days. Wong, a local farmer, borrowed even larger sums from the Bank of Hueneme, obtaining $2,000 to $3,000 on crop mortgages (Fairbanks (1963 ), Jennings, (1984 ).
Conclusion
Although the Bank of A. Levy was modest even by the standards of country national banks, it was a well-developed commercial banking establishment by the turn of the nineteenth century. The bank fulfilled the financing needs of an expanding agricultural community and made loans to a broad cross section of the county. Loans were simple uncollateralized promissory notes that were made on the banker s judgment of the character and risk of the borrower. Loan rates varied considerably with the perceived reputation and risk of the borrower. Integrated into the money market, the loan portfolio was funded by the bank s capital, and a significant infusion of borrowed funds. Although the average or estimated aggregate loan rates were apparently high, the modal borrower obtained credit at 4 percent, a rate comparable with some of the best rates in the country.
Nevertheless, the risky loans and the high rates paid on them enabled the bank to enjoy an overall high rate of return.
